austindefender

January 31, 2010

“We close at 5:00″

Filed under: Uncategorized — Lance Stott @ 12:25 pm

Judge Berchelmann issued his findings the other day in the ethics complaint against Judge Keller.  (This is the case where Keller stopped Michael Richard’s lawyers from filing a last-minute appeal to stop his execution: “We close at 5:00,” she said.)

He says Judge Keller is mostly blameless.  Instead, he finds fault with Richard’s lawyers.  “TDS (Texas Defender Services)” he says, “has only itself to blame” for Richard’s execution.

What’s surprising about Berchelmann’s judgment is that it’s an answer to a question that wasn’t asked.

The question that was asked was whether Judge Keller followed the rules that applied to judges.  By finding the lawyers responsible for Richard’s death he’s answering a different question: “Was TDS responsible for Richard’s death?”

That judges are supposed to answer the question that is presented is a basic rule of law.   (One of the reasons for that rule is illustrated by this case: Not knowing they’d been charged with incompetence, Richard’s lawyers could not present a defense.)

When told Richard’s lawyers were trying to file an appeal after 5:00, Keller had two choices.  She could say, “Judge Johnson is the assigned judge to hear appeals after 5:00,” or she could say, “Tell them we close at 5:00.”

One is consistent with being an impartial (rather than pro-prosecution) judge.

When asked, Keller said she’d do it all over again.

Berchelmann says he does not believe her:

“Although she says that if she could do it all over again she would not change any of her actions, this cannot be true.  Any reasonable person, having gone through this ordeal, surely would realize that open communication, particularly during the hectic few hours before an execution, would benefit the interests of justice.”

Berchelmann may not believe her, but I do.

January 27, 2010

Thoughts on Citizens United v. Election Commission

Filed under: Uncategorized — Lance Stott @ 1:30 pm

I’m not sure Citizens United is the disaster some have it out to be. I don’t think we’re  about to experience the end of democracy, or see Ronald McDonald in the White House.

I’m also not sure it’s wrong – in fact, I think it’s correct.

Descriptions of Citizens United in the media have been inaccurate. Which is not surprising.  The opinion is obscure.  The syllabus alone runs to  7 pages, and with dissents and concurrences it all adds up to 183 pages.

The meat of the decision starts on page 27, where the Court quotes the First Amendment:

“Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech…”

While we typically think of the First Amendment as a right, technically it’s a prohibition.   It’s a limit on government power.  If you accept this, then the identity of the speaker doesn’t matter.  Or, as the Court says, “The identity of the  speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected.”

The Court goes on to identify the law as the kind of law the Court has traditionally been  most suspicious of:  it is a law enforced with a criminal penalty that strikes at speech at the heart of the First Amendment: political speech – in this case, speech about candidates for public office.

The law is “an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions.  [It] makes it a felony for all corporations – including nonprofit advocacy corporations – either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications…”

The Court identifies the ACLU and the NRA as organizations affected by the ban.  The ACLU could, for example, say “Support candidates who support free speech,” but it can’t say “Support candidate X who supports free speech.”

Finally, the law discriminates: if a corporation owns a media company, it’s free to do as it likes.  The corporations that own Fox News and The New York Times have freedoms other corporations do not.

The Court identifies “strict scrutiny” as the constitutional test to be applied. (Though,  interestingly, does not seem to actually apply it.) The Court points out that, in effect,  it’s returning to an older line of cases, and spends many pages attacking the rationale  behind the decision it’s overturning.

For my part, I have no problem with the idea that corporations don’t have “rights” in the  human sense of the word.  Corporations, are, however, little more than associations of  people, and the mechanisms set up to stop them from identifying with or supporting certain  candidates strike me as cumbersome and unworkable – more likely to snare the innocent than  catch the guilty.  Corporations that really want to get involved in politics, in other  words, are already doing it – they’re just being sneaky about it.

Moreover, the specter of a new flood of corporations flooding the airwaves to tell us whom  to vote for seems farfectched.  Does McDonalds really want to piss off half their customers  by supporting the candidate of the other half?  Does Pepsi really want to be known as “The  Voice of the Republican Party”?

I doubt it.

January 5, 2010

DNA Testing

Filed under: law — Lance Stott @ 1:37 pm

DNA is often considered definitive proof in criminal cases.

In “Calculated Risk” Gerd Gigerenzer reminds us it may not be as reliable as people think it is.

The expert witness testifies that there are about 10 million men who could have been the perpetrator.  The probability of a randomly selected man having a DNA profile, that is identical with the trace recovered from the crime scen is approximately 0.0001 percent.  If a man has this DNA profile, it is practically certain that a DNA analysis shows a match.  If a man does not have this DNA profile, current DNA technology leads to a reported match with a probability of only 0.001 percent.

A match between the DNA of the defendant and the traces on the victim has been reported.

Question 1.  What is the probability that the reported match is a true match, that is, that the person actually has this DNA profile?

Question 2.  What is the probability that the person is the source of the trace?

Question 3.  Please render your verdict for this case: Guilty or not guilty?

You might want to think about it for a minute.

According to Gigerenzer, the answer to the first question is that the probability of a “true match” is 9%, or 1/11.  In other words, the chances are 91% that the defendant’s DNA doesn’t match the perpetrator’s – that the lab made a mistake.

Gigerenzer says the chances that the defendant is the “source of the trace” – in other words, that it was his DNA – is even lower: 0.9%, or less than one in a hundred (1/110, to be precise).

Of course, all that depends on the defendant having been selected at random, from a pool of 10 million men.  That’s not usually how it happens.  If there is other evidence that the defendant is guilty – in other words, some other reason the defendant was tested, other than being one among 10 million men – Gigerenzer’s calculations won’t work.

Still, his calculations show how dangerous it is to rely on DNA alone.

More importantly, Gegerenzer discusses the possibility of lab error, about which surprisingly little is known.

The laboratories that do the work are surprisingly hostile to outsiders. Independent testing of the results of their work is rare.  The FBI has resisted efforts to discover the results of their own internal tests.

Gigerenzer says that one of the few outside studies of laboratory error, two out of three labs reported false positives (matches that weren’t there), when sent a batch of 50 samples.  In a subsequent test, one year later, one out of the three reported a false match.

Experts say the error rate is between 1 in 100 and 1 in 200.

All of which makes DNA expert-witness testimony about the accuracy of DNA tests meaningless.  When an expert testifies that the chances of a random match are 1 in a million, or whatever, he’s talking about the chances excluding the possibility of human error.

Human error, however, can’t be excluded.

January 4, 2010

Glass Half Full

Filed under: Uncategorized — Lance Stott @ 12:10 pm

Grits is always interesting.  I thought this bit was especially  noteworthy:   According to the Office of Court Administration, the Court of Criminal Appeals is less than indiscriminate when it comes to overturning decisions of the lower courts.  Austin decisions came in for special attention 35.5% of the time.  By way of comparison, Dallas decisions merited special attention 3% of the time, Ft. Worth 3.3%, and the 14th court in Houston 2.5%.

In other news, the CCA wrote fewer opinions last year than in any year since 1994.  So there is a silver lining, I guess.

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